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http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG767.sum.pdf
Reorganizing U.S. Domestic Intelligence
Assessing the Options
By: Gregory F. Treverton
One of the questions in the fight against terrorism is whether the United States needs a dedicated domestic intelligence agency separate from law enforcement, on the model of many comparable democracies. To examine this issue, Congress directed that the Department of Homeland Security perform an independent study on the feasibility of creating a counterterrorism intelligence agency and the department turned to the RAND Corporation for this analysis but asked it specifically not to make a recommendation. This volume lays out the relevant considerations for creating such an agency. It draws on a variety of research methods, including historical and legal analysis; a review of organizational theory; examination of current domestic intelligence efforts, their history, and the public's view of them; examination of the domestic intelligence agencies in six other democracies; and interviews with an expert panel made up of current and former intelligence and law enforcement professionals. The monograph highlights five principal problems that might be seen to afflict current domestic intelligence enterprise; for each, there are several possible solutions, and the creation of a new agency addresses only some of the five problems. The volume discusses how a technique called break-even analysis can be used to evaluate proposals for a new agency in the context of the perceived magnitude of the terrorism threat. It concludes with a discussion of how to address the unanswered questions and lack of information that currently cloud the debate over whether to create a dedicated domestic intelligence agency.
Table S.1
Expressed Concerns and Possible Responses
Expressed Concern Possible Responses
If the FBI is dominated by a law
enforcement and case-based approach;
and if, as a result, collection is
dominated by case requirements and
analysis is dominated by operational
support . . .
. . . then increase resources, change
organization, change culture, change
laws, change regulations or orders, and/or
improve leadership.
If the FBI, CIA, and other agencies do
not talk to each other . . .
. . . then change organization, change
culture, change laws, change regulations
or orders, enhance collaboration, and/or
improve leadership.
If too much poor-quality information is
collected, and collection efforts are too
uncoordinated . . .
. . . then change regulations or orders,
enhance collaboration, and/or improve
leadership.
If analysis is fragmented and sometimes
conflicting; and if the National
Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), which
acts as a central clearinghouse, mostly
provides information to the President
rather than to other intelligence
organizations . . .
. . . then change organization, change
regulations or orders, enhance
collaboration, and/or improve leadership.
If it is difficult to move information and
analysis across the domestic intelligence
enterprise . . .
. . . then increase resources, change
regulations or orders, enhance
collaboration, and/or improve leadership.
Less dramatic organizational change could also be relevant. The
Bureau created the National Security Branch to emphasize prevention
and intelligence, particularly in the counterterrorism mission. That
was part of an effort to transform culture in a number of ways, from
re centralizing the management of terrorism cases, to training, to instituting
a five-year “up or out” cap on supervisors to breed new leaders.
Rapid growth means that more than half of FBI agents now have
served for less than five years, presumably having joined an organization
they did not perceive as dominated by traditional law enforcement.
Changed laws, such as the PATRIOT Act, made it easier to
collect counterterrorism intelligence, especially of the more exploratory
sort, and changed regulations had the same effect, including dismantling
the wall between intelligence and law enforcement.
Before its recent transformation, the FBI had a mission divided
between law enforcement and intelligence. The question is whether
a transformed FBI whose mission was intelligence-driven prevention
would in fact have the clarity of a single mission. While law enforcement
is a tool in prevention and can aid intelligence—if, for instance,
the threat of prosecution helps recruit informants—the two remain
quite different disciplines. The question is whether a transformed FBI
whose mission was intelligence-driven prevention would in fact have the
clarity of a single mission. Our assessment of other countries’ domestic
intelligence services suggested the value of a single focus, one that can
foster what might be called a “culture of prevention” with respect to
terrorism. Perhaps the single greatest teething pain of DHS—which
brought together 180,000 employees from 22 existing agencies—has
been that the constituent agencies did not share a single mission.
The other advantage of a separate service suggested by the review
of other countries is that the new service might be able to draw on a
wider, more diverse recruitment pool. The foreign services we reviewed
feel that they are more able to attract individuals who would not normally
be interested in entering a law enforcement profession, such as
linguists, historians, social scientists, psychologists, economists and
country/regional experts.
Yet the history of organizational design, and reorganization, in
the public sector is cautionary in that it shows the process to be one
of political competition among interests and interest groups. This
helps explain why reorganizations in government so often seem to
fail. If a new domestic intelligence service were created in “normal”
circumstances—that is, not in the wake of another major attack—the
result would be a political compromise and an agency that would likely
not reflect exactly what any participant in the process sought.
The devil would be in the details, which would themselves be the
result of compromises in the political arena. For instance, if the authorizing
legislation were written in very specific terms, that would tie the
hands of future officials in the organization—or insulate them from
future pressures, depending on one’s view of the outcome. The more
independence a new agency had, the more autonomy it would have in
shaping and sustaining its mission. If the new agency were located in
some departmental hierarchy, it would surely matter which one: Being
in the Department of Justice would make it part of an established organization
dominated by law enforcement, whereas a location in DHS
would subject it to the pressures of a work in progress, one now influenced
by several forces, not the least of which are border control and
crisis management.
Similarly, how many political appointees the agency had and
whether they were appointed for fixed terms would also matter. The
FBI is a very closed professional service, one dominated by its agents,
with only a single political appointee—the director—and that appointee
has a fixed, ten-year term. Until recently, lateral movements into
the Bureau’s senior managerial ranks were rare, and even now they
are driven by needs for technical or management expertise, not politics.
These considerations would all be important for a new agency, as
would the height and width of the agency’s hierarchy, the agency’s latitude
in selecting and training the professionals that would compose it,
and a host of other details.
The other advantage of a separate service suggested by the review
of other countries is that the new service might be able to draw on a
wider, more diverse recruitment pool. The foreign services we reviewed
feel that they are more able to attract individuals who would not normally
be interested in entering a law enforcement profession, such as
linguists, historians, social scientists, psychologists, economists and
country/regional experts.
Yet the history of organizational design, and reorganization, in
the public sector is cautionary in that it shows the process to be one
of political competition among interests and interest groups. This
helps explain why reorganizations in government so often seem to
fail. If a new domestic intelligence service were created in “normal”
Summary xv
circumstances—that is, not in the wake of another major attack—the
result would be a political compromise and an agency that would likely
not reflect exactly what any participant in the process sought.
The devil would be in the details, which would themselves be the
result of compromises in the political arena. For instance, if the authorizing
legislation were written in very specific terms, that would tie the
hands of future officials in the organization—or insulate them from
future pressures, depending on one’s view of the outcome. The more
independence a new agency had, the more autonomy it would have in
shaping and sustaining its mission. If the new agency were located in
some departmental hierarchy, it would surely matter which one: Being
in the Department of Justice would make it part of an established organization
dominated by law enforcement, whereas a location in DHS
would subject it to the pressures of a work in progress, one now influenced
by several forces, not the least of which are border control and
crisis management.
Similarly, how many political appointees the agency had and
whether they were appointed for fixed terms would also matter. The
FBI is a very closed professional service, one dominated by its agents,
with only a single political appointee—the director—and that appointee
has a fixed, ten-year term. Until recently, lateral movements into
the Bureau’s senior managerial ranks were rare, and even now they
are driven by needs for technical or management expertise, not politics.
These considerations would all be important for a new agency, as
would the height and width of the agency’s hierarchy, the agency’s latitude
in selecting and training the professionals that would compose it,
and a host of other details.
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